### IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,	)
Plaintiff,	)
v.	) Case No. 5:22-CR-60-KDE
MICHAEL KOHN, et. al.,	)
Defendants.	)

## <u>DEFENDANT KOHN'S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT OF ACQUITTAL OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL</u>

Defendant Michael Kohn ("Kohn"), by and through undersigned counsel, respectfully moves this Court to enter a judgment of acquittal pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure ("Rule") 29(c) as to Counts 2 through 12 and 18 through 22 of the indictment (Doc. 1). In the alternative, Kohn moves this Court to grant him a new trial pursuant to Rule 33.<sup>1</sup>

### I. Relevant Background

On November 16, 2022, Kohn was charged with one count of a *Klein*-type conspiracy (Count 1), sixteen counts of willfully aiding and assisting in the preparation of false tax returns (Counts 2 through 12 and 18 through 22), and one count of wire fraud (Count 23). (*See* Doc. 1). The indictment also contained a Notice of Forfeiture and Finding of Probable Cause. (*Id.*).

On December 21, 2022, Kohn made his initial appearance pursuant to a summons in this Court. (Doc. 10). On the same date, Kohn was arraigned and entered a plea of not guilty to all counts and denied the forfeiture allegation.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> In addition to this motion, Kohn adopts and joins any motion filed by a co-defendant seeking a judgment of acquittal under Rule 29 or a new trial under Rule 33.

On June 5, 2023, the Government moved to dismiss Count 23 of the indictment (wire fraud). (Doc. 60). That same day, this Court dismissed Count 23. (Doc. 61). As such, Kohn was then charged with Counts 1, 2 through 12, and 18 through 22. This Court also granted Kohn's motion to strike the forfeiture allegation. (Doc. 95).

Prior to trial, Kohn filed numerous motions, including several motions in limine. Of relevance to this motion, Kohn filed a motion seeking to exclude any evidence of his prior conviction and plea agreement. (Doc. 135). Following a hearing, the Court orally denied this motion in limine on April 4, 2024.

On April 15, 2024, Kohn proceeded to trial maintaining his plea of not guilty as to all remaining counts. At the close of the Government's case-in-chief, Kohn timely moved this Court to enter a judgment of acquittal pursuant to Rule 29(a). (Doc. 195). This Court denied Kohn's motion. (Doc. 206).

### II. This Court Should Enter a Judgment of Acquittal Under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29

"A defendant may move for a judgment of acquittal . . . after a guilty verdict," and, based on that motion, "the court may set aside the verdict and enter an acquittal." Fed. R. Crim. P. 29(c)(1) and (c)(2). "The test for deciding a motion for a judgment of acquittal is whether there is substantial evidence (direct or circumstantial) which, taken in the light most favorable to the prosecution, would warrant a jury finding that the defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." *United States v. MacCloskey*, 682 F.2d 468, 473 (4th Cir. 1982) (overturning a count of conviction because the finding of guilt "would require pure conjecture on the part of the jury"). However, "[s]ubstantial evidence" does not mean merely "a scintilla" of evidence. *United States v. Taylor*, 800 F.3d 701, 711 (6th Cir. 2015) (quoting *United States v. Martin*, 375 F.2d 956, 957 (6th Cir. 1967)). Rather, "substantial evidence is evidence that a reasonable finder of fact could

accept as adequate and sufficient to support a conclusion of a defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." *United States v. Burgos*, 94 F.3d 849, 862 (4th Cir. 1996). In evaluating a motion under Rule 29, "this standard applies to each material element of the offense." *United States v. Dominguez*, 604 F.2d 304, 310 (4th Cir. 1979).

When considering this motion, this Court has the responsibility of protecting Kohn's Fifth Amendment rights. *See, e.g., United States v. Valle*, 807 F.3d 508, 513-515 (2d Cir. 2015) (If courts "are to be faithful to the constitutional requirement that no person may be convicted unless the Government has proven guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, we must take seriously our obligation to assess the record to determine . . . whether a jury could reasonably find guilty beyond a reasonable doubt") (alteration in original) (internal quotations omitted). This means that "specious inferences are not indulged, because it would not satisfy the Constitution to have a jury determine that the defendant is probably guilty. If the evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution gives equal or nearly equal circumstantial support to a theory of guilt and a theory of innocence, then a reasonable jury must necessarily entertain a reasonable doubt." *Id.* (quoting *United States v. Lorenzo*, 534 F.3d 153, 159 (2d Cir. 2008)).

### A. The *Bronston* Literal Truth Defense Requires a Judgment of Acquittal for Counts 2 through 12 and 18 through 22

It is well settled in this Circuit that the *Bronston* literal truth defense applies to allegations arising out of allegedly false statements on government forms.<sup>2</sup> *See Bronston v. United States*, 409 U.S. 352, 359-362 (1973) (reversing perjury conviction where the answers were "literally truthful" even if the defendant "intended to mislead"); *United States v. Good*, 326 F.3d 589, 590 (4th Cir. 2003) (reversing 18 U.S.C. § 1001 conviction where defendant's statement on a form that she was

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> The literal truth defense does not apply in cases in which the focus is on the ambiguity of the question asked, but that is not the issue before this Court. *See United States v. Sarwari*, 669 F.3d 401 (4th Cir. 2012).

never convicted of crimes enumerated on an application was "literally true" even if designed to mislead); *United States v. Baer*, 92 F. App'x 942, 943 (4th Cir. 2004) (unpublished) (affirming dismissal of 18 U.S.C. § 1001 count where statement on a form was "literally true" but inconsistent with the intent of the question); *United States v. Hairston*, 46 F.3d 361, 376 (4th Cir. 1995) (reversing perjury before a grand jury conviction because a "perjury conviction cannot be based upon evasive answers or even upon misleading answers so long as they are literally true").

In Good, for example, the defendant was charged with knowingly and willfully making a materially false statement on an application for an airport Security Identification Area badge "that she had not been convicted of any of the disqualifying crimes listed on the application when in fact, as the defendant then and there knew, she had been so convicted." Good, 326 F.3d at 591. As such, "the alleged false statement was her response to a question on the application." Id. The defendant had undisputedly pleaded guilty to the crime of embezzlement, however that "was not one of the crimes listed on the application." *Id.* at 592. "Given the wording of the question and the crime for which the defendant was convicted, her answers on the application were thus literally true; the defendant has never been convicted of any of the crimes listed on the application." *Id*. The Government focused on "the intent of the question" and argued embezzlement falls within the purview of the disqualifying crimes of "theft, fraud, dishonesty, and misrepresentation." Id. However, the Fourth Circuit correctly held that the defendant "was indicted for the statements that she made on the SIDA application and the language of that application controlled," therefore "her answers were literally true." Id. Relying on Bronston, a Fifth Circuit case and an Eighth Circuit case, the Fourth Circuit held a defendant cannot be held criminally responsible for making a false statement on a form when the statement based on the instructions on the form is "literally true." *Id.* (emphasis added).

In *Baer*, the Fourth Circuit similarly considered a case where a defendant had undisputedly been convicted "of brandishing a firearm" but never of the "use' of a firearm." *Baer*, 92 F. App'x at 945. Because the question on the government form Mr. Baer completed was "a narrowly worded question" and because his answer was "literally true," the Fourth Circuit correctly ruled he could not be convicted of making a false statement on that form. *Id.* at 945-46.


The same analysis applies with full force to this case. The counts at issue charge Kohn with willfully "report[ing] false items on the lines and in the amounts listed" in a table in the indictment, and allege that he "then and there well knew and believed the amounts on the lines listed below were substantially understated." (See Doc. 1). Each count at issue in this motion alleges the "Total income" line as the sole "False Item" and each count states the applicable line number for the respective return. (Id.). (The line numbers are different only because the IRS forms changed from year to year; each refers to the "Total Income" line on the U.S. Individual Income Tax Return, Form 1040.) (See id.).

The Government claims that, post-*Bronston*, the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") "fixed" this issue by altering the jurat to be more inclusive of sources of income not requested on the form. *First*, that is not the issue in this case. The Forms 1040 filed in this case request all the categories of income relevant to the taxpayers in this case, and no allegation was made, in the indictment or the trial, that categories of income were omitted. *Second*, the IRS isn't the party that made these charging decisions. The Government, through its attorneys, chose which lines to include in the indictment as being false. There is no requirement for limiting the lines which the Government alleges are false. The Government chose "total income," the Government chose the one with the clear instructions to simply add up certain other lines, and the Government could not, and did not, prove that the "total income" line was materially false.

The fatal problem for the Government's case as to these counts is that the representations on the allegedly false line numbers are literally true. For instance, Count 2 alleges that line 22 of the 2017 IRS Form 1040, U.S. Individual Income Tax Return, for C.S. and S.S. is false. (Doc. 1). Line 22 directs the taxpayer and the preparer to "[c]ombine the amounts in the far right column for lines 7 through 21" and then the form itself states, "This is your total income." (bold in original). On this tax return, the sum total of lines 7 through 21 requires the following arithmetic: \$139,157 (line 7) plus 28 (line 8a) plus 1 (line 13) plus 0 (line 16b) plus \$130,506 (line 17) minus \$93,710 (line 21). That equals \$175,982. The indictment alleges that the "amount[]" of \$175,982 written on Line 22 and represented to be "Total income" is the "false item" that forms the basis of Count 2. (See Doc. 1). However, \$175,982 is literally true because it follows the specific instructions on the form and because it is the IRS on the form itself that is making the representation, "This is your total income," not the taxpayer or preparer. Just as in Good—where the "wording of the question" was the subject of the Fourth Circuit's inquiry and where "the language of that application controlled," the representation on Line 22 of this tax return is by any measure "literally true." Good, 326 F.3d at 591-592. An excerpt of this return, admitted as Government Exhibit 190, is inserted below:


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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> The Court can take judicial notice of mathematical computation under Fed. R. Evid. 201 as such are not reasonably subject to dispute. *See, e.g., Miller v. Fed. Land Bank of Spokane*, 587 F.2d 415, 422 (9th Cir. 1978) (holding that trial court must take judicial notice of a reduction in mortgage debt because "[t]his is a matter of mathematics, of which the court could and should have taken judicial notice"); *State v. Kwong*, 482 P.3d 1067, 1075 (Hawaii 2021) ("A fact may also be common knowledge if it can be derived 'by a process of combining facts that are generally known' using mathematics.") (citing 21B Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Kenneth W. Graham, Jr., Federal Practice and Procedure § 5105 (2d ed. 2020)).




This is precisely true on every other count at issue in this motion.

Count 3 alleges that line 22 of the 2018 IRS Form 1040, U.S. Individual Income Tax Return, for C.S. and S.S. is false. (Doc. 1). Line 22 of the form states "Amount you owe." (bold in original) and directs the taxpayer and the preparer to "Subtract line 18 from line 15." On this tax return, the total of line 18 subtracted from line 15 requires the following arithmetic: \$10,171 (line 15) minus \$13,430 (line 18). That equals -\$3,250. However, even though the indictment alleges that the "amount[]" of \$150,838 is written on Line 22 and is the "False item" on the return that forms the basis of Count 3, there is *no amount written on line 22* of this tax return—thus there is *no statement*, true or false, on line 22. (*See* Doc. 1). For that reason alone, this Court must grant a judgment of acquittal because no reasonable jury can conclude Kohn willfully made a false statement on Line 22 of the tax return when he made no statement at all on that line. An excerpt of this return, admitted as Government Exhibit 191, is inserted below:




Count 4 alleges that line 7b of the 2019 IRS Form 1040, U.S. Individual Income Tax Return, for C.S. and S.S. is false. (Doc. 1). Line 7b directs the taxpayer and the preparer to "Add lines 1, 2b, 3b, 4b, 4d, 6, and 7a" and then the form itself states, "This is your **total income**." (bold in original). On this tax return, the sum total of lines 1, 2b, 3b, 4b, 4d, 6, and 7a requires the following arithmetic: \$137,606 (line 1), plus \$32 (line 2b), plus \$50 (line 3b), plus \$90,408 (line 7a). That equals \$228,096. The indictment alleges that the "amount[]" of \$228,096 written on Line 7b and represented to be "Total income" is the "false item" that forms the basis of Count 4. (*See* Doc. 1). However, \$228,096 is literally true because it follows the specific instructions on the form *and* because it is the IRS on the form itself that is making the representation, "This is your **total income**," not the taxpayer or preparer. Just as in *Good*—where the "wording of the question" was the subject of the Fourth Circuit's inquiry and where "the language of that application controlled,"

the representation on Line 7b of this tax return is by any measure "literally true." *Good*, 326 F.3d at 591-592. An excerpt of this return, admitted as Government Exhibit 192, is inserted below:



Count 5 alleges that line 22 of the 2015 IRS Form 1040, U.S. Individual Income Tax Return, for L.B. and K.B. is false. (Doc. 1). Line 22 directs the taxpayer and the preparer to "Combine the amounts in the far right column for lines 7 through 21" and then the form itself states, "This is your **total income**." (bold in original). On this tax return, the sum total of lines 7 through 21 requires the following arithmetic: \$970 (line 7), plus \$453 (line 8a), plus \$0 (line 16b), plus \$141,237 (line 17) minus \$560,845 (line 21). That equals -\$418,185. The indictment alleges that the "amount[]" of -\$418,185 written on Line 22 and represented to be "Total income" is the "false item" that forms the basis of Count 5. (*See* Doc. 1). However, -\$418,185 is literally true because it follows the specific instructions on the form <u>and</u> because it is the IRS on the form itself that is making the representation, "This is your **total income**," not the taxpayer or preparer. Just as in *Good*—where the "wording of the question" was the subject of the Fourth Circuit's inquiry and where "the language of that application controlled," the representation on Line 22 of this tax return is by any measure "literally true." *Good*, 326 F.3d at 591-592. An excerpt of this return, admitted as Government Exhibit 15, is inserted below:



Count 6 alleges that line 22 of the 2016 IRS Form 1040X, Amended U.S. Individual Income Tax Return, for L.B. and K.B. falsely states the total income as "\$-649,512". (Doc. 1). But Line 22 undisputedly directs the taxpayer and the preparer to state the "Amount of line 21 you want **refunded to you**" (bold in original). On the tax return charged in the indictment—the "2016 Form 1040X" (Doc. 1)—line 22 is blank. Thus, even though the indictment alleges that the "amount[]" of "\$-649,512" is written on Line 22 and is the "False item" on the return that forms the basis of Count 6, there is *no amount written on line 22* of this tax return—thus there is *no statement*, true or false, on line 22. (*See* Doc. 1). For that reason alone, this Court must grant a judgment of acquittal because no reasonable jury can conclude Kohn willfully made a false statement on Line 22 of the tax return when he made no statement at all on that line. An excerpt of this return, admitted as Government Exhibit 17, is inserted below:


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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> To the extent the Court were to look at line 22 of the 2016 IRS Form 1040, the taxpayer and preparer were instructed to "combine the amounts in the far right column for lines 7 through 21. This is your **total** income". The sum total of lines 7 through 21 requires the following arithmetic: -\$218,727 (line 17), plus -\$430,785 (line 21). That equals -\$649,512. The indictment alleges that the "amount[]" of -\$649,512 written on Line 22 and represented to be "Total income" is the "false item" that forms the basis of Count 6. (*See* Doc. 1). However, -\$649,512 is literally true because


Form 104		ent of the Treasury — Internal Revenue Service S. Individual Income Tax Retu IX and its separate instructions is at www.irs	s.gov/form1940x.
This return i	s for calendar year X 2016 .	2015 2014 2013	3
Other year.	Enter one: calendar year or	fiscal year (month and year ended):	
Your first name a	and initial	Last name	Year social security number
Larry A		Bare	-1835
	spouse's first name and initial	Last name	Speuso's social security number
Karen C	Waren C Bare		-0134
	mount You Owe ent, if any, as shown on original return or as	previously adjusted by the IRS	18
	ne 18 from line 17 (If less than zero, see insti		
	ou owe. If line 11, column C, is more than line		20
21 If line 11, 0	column C. is less than tine 19, enter the differ	rence. This is the amount overpaid on this re-	turn 21
	line 21 you want refunded to you		22
22 Amount of		estimated tax 23	製造の基金のである。 では、またいでは、 では、 では、 では、 では、 では、 では、 では、
	line 21 you want applied to your (enter year)		
	line 21 you want applied to your (enter year)		emplete and sign this form on Page 2.

Count 7 alleges that line 22 of the 2017 IRS Form 1040, U.S. Individual Income Tax Return, for G.B. and N.B. is false. (Doc. 1). Line 22 directs the taxpayer and the preparer to "[c]ombine the amounts in the far right column for lines 7 through 21" and then the form itself states, "This is your total income." (bold in original). On this tax return, the sum total of lines 7 through 21 requires the following arithmetic: \$2,400 (line 7) plus \$10,003 (line 8a), plus \$7,860 (line 9a), minus \$8,907 (line 12), minus \$3,000 (line 13) plus \$0 (line 16b) minus \$26,155 (line 17), plus \$13,089 (line 18). That equals -\$4,710. The indictment alleges that the "amount[]" of -\$4,710 written on Line 22 and represented to be "Total income" is the "false item" that forms the basis of Count 7. (See Doc. 1). However, -\$4,710 is literally true because it follows the specific instructions on the form and because it is the IRS on the form itself that is making the representation, "This is your **total income**," not the taxpayer or preparer. Just as in *Good*—where the "wording of the question" was the subject of the Fourth Circuit's inquiry and where "the language of that application controlled," the representation on Line 22 of this tax return is by any measure "literally true." Good, 326 F.3d at 591-592. An excerpt of this return, admitted as Government Exhibit 33, is inserted below:

it follows the specific instructions on the form <u>and</u> because it is the IRS on the form itself that is making the representation, "This is your **total income**," not the taxpayer or preparer. Just as in *Good*—where the "wording of the question" was the subject of the Fourth Circuit's inquiry and where "the language of that application controlled," the representation on Line 22 of this tax return is by any measure "literally true." *Good*, 326 F.3d at 591-592.



Count 8 alleges that line 6 of the 2018 IRS Form 1040, U.S. Individual Income Tax Return, for G.B. and N.B. is false. (Doc. 1). Line 6 directs the taxpayer and the preparer to "Add lines 1 through 5. Add any amount from Schedule 1, line 22" and the form itself states, "Total income." (bold in original). On this tax return, the sum total of lines 1 through 5 and Schedule 1 line 22 requires the following arithmetic: \$2,400 (line1), plus \$12,528 (line 2b), plus \$7,211 (line 3b), plus 0000000000022423 (line 5b), plus \$21,028 (line 22). That equals \$65,591. The indictment alleges that the "amount[]" of \$65,591 written on Line 6 and represented to be "Total income" is the "false item" that forms the basis of Count 8. (See Doc. 1). However, \$65,591 is literally true because it follows the specific instructions on the form and because it is the IRS on the form itself that is making the representation, "This is your total income," not the taxpayer or preparer. Just as in Good—where the "wording of the question" was the subject of the Fourth Circuit's inquiry and where "the language of that application controlled," the representation on Line 6 of this tax return is by any measure "literally true." Good, 326 F.3d at 591-592. An excerpt of this return, admitted as Government Exhibit 34, is inserted below:



Count 9 alleges that line 6 of the 2019 IRS Form 1040, U.S. Individual Income Tax Return, for G.B. and N.B. falsely states the total income as "\$150,730". (Doc. 1). But Line 6 of the actual return filed by G.B. and N.B., a 2019 Form 1040-SR, U.S. Tax Return for Seniors, calls for the taxpayer to report "Capital gain or (loss)." On the tax return as charged in the indictment—the "2019 Form 1040" (Doc. 1)—line 6 says "\$16,968." Thus, even though the indictment alleges that the "amount[]" of "\$150,730" is written on Line 6 and is the "False item" on the return that forms the basis of Count 9, the amount on Line 6 is "\$16,968" and represents "Capital gain or (loss)." For that reason alone, this Court must grant a judgment of acquittal because no reasonable jury can conclude Kohn willfully made a false statement of "\$150,730" on Line 6 of the tax return when Line 6 contains the amount "\$16,968." An excerpt of this return, admitted as Government Exhibit 35, is inserted below:


<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> To the extent the Court were to look at line 7b of the 2019 IRS Form 1040, which does reference total income, the taxpayer and preparer were instructed to "Add lines 1, 2b, 3b, 4b, 4d, 5b, 6, and 7a. This is your **total income**". The sum total of the named lines requires the following arithmetic: \$2,400 (line 1), plus \$755 (line 2b), plus \$18,188 (line 3b), plus \$8,147 (line 4b), plus \$42,310 (line 5b), plus \$16,968 (line 6), plus \$61,962 (line 7a). That equals \$150,730. The indictment alleges that the "amount[]" of \$150,730 written on Line 6 and represented to be "Total income" is the "false item" that forms the basis of Count 9. (*See* Doc. 1). However, \$150,730 is literally true because it follows the specific instructions on the form <u>and</u> because it is the IRS on the form itself that is making the representation, "This is your **total income**," not the taxpayer or preparer. Just as in *Good*—where the "wording of the question" was the subject of the Fourth Circuit's inquiry and where "the language of that application controlled," the representation on Line 7b of this tax return is by any measure "literally true." *Good*, 326 F.3d at 591-592.

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if required.	3a	Qualified dividends	3a	16,074.	<b>b</b> Ordinary dividends	ds	3b	18,188.
	4a	IRA distributions	4a	8,146.	<b>b</b> Taxable amount		4b	8,147.
	c	Pensions and annuities.	4c		d Taxable amount		4d	
	5a	Social security benefits.	5a	49,776.	<b>b</b> Taxable amount		5b	42,310.
	6	Capital gain or (loss). Attach Sc	hedule	D if required. If not req	quired, check here	▶ □	6	16,968.
	7a	Other income from Schei	dule 1	, line 9			7a	61,962.
	b	Add lines 1, 2b, 3b, 4b, 4	ld, 5b	, 6, and 7a. This is	your total income.		7b	150,730.

Count 10 alleges that line 6 of the 2017 IRS Form 1040, U.S. Individual Income Tax Return, for D.N. is false. (Doc. 1). But Line 6, which is not a line, but a series of lines under the heading "Exemptions," does not report any monetary amount. On the tax return as charged in the indictment—the "2017 Form 1040" (Doc. 1)—line 6d, which is a summation, says "2." Thus, even though the indictment alleges that the "amount[]" of "\$121,770" is written on Line 6 and is the "False item" on the return that forms the basis of Count 10, the amount on Line 6d is "2" and represents a summation of "Exemptions." For that reason alone, this Court must grant a judgment of acquittal because no reasonable jury can conclude Kohn willfully made a false statement of "\$121,770" on Line 6 of the tax return when Line 6d contains the amount "2." An excerpt of this return, admitted as Government Exhibit 93, is inserted below:


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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> To the extent the Court were to look at line 22 of the 2017 IRS Form 1040, which does reference total income, the taxpayer and preparer were instructed to "Combine the amounts listed in the far right column for lines 7 through 21. This is your **total** income". The sum total of the named lines requires the following arithmetic: \$124,999 (line 7), plus \$109 (line 8a), plus -\$27,195 (line 12), plus -\$3,000 (line 13), plus \$182,607 (line 17), plus -\$155,750 (line 21). That equals \$121,770. The indictment alleges that the "amount[]" of \$121,770 written on Line 6 and represented to be "Total income" is the "false item" that forms the basis of Count 10. (*See* Doc. 1). However, \$121,770 is literally true because it follows the specific instructions on the form *and* because it is the IRS on the form itself that is making the representation, "This is your **total income**," not the taxpayer or preparer. Just as in *Good*—where the "wording of the question" was the subject of the Fourth Circuit's inquiry and where "the language of that application controlled," the representation on Line 22 of this tax return is by any measure "literally true." *Good*, 326 F.3d at 591-592.




Count 11 alleges that line 6 of the 2018 IRS Form 1040, U.S. Individual Income Tax Return, for D.N. is false. (Doc. 1). Line 6 directs the taxpayer and the preparer to "Add lines 1 through 5. Add any amount from Schedule 1, line 22" and the form itself states, "Total income." (bold in original). On this tax return, the sum total of lines 1 through 5 and Schedule 1 line 22 requires the following arithmetic: \$125,000 (line1), plus \$11 (line 2b), minus \$20,128 (line 22). That equals \$104,883. The indictment alleges that the "amount[]" of \$104,883 written on Line 6 and represented to be "Total income" is the "false item" that forms the basis of Count 11 (*See* Doc. 1). However, \$104,883 is literally true because it follows the specific instructions on the form *and* because it is the IRS on the form itself that is making the representation, "This is your total income," not the taxpayer or preparer. Just as in *Good*—where the "wording of the question" was the subject of the Fourth Circuit's inquiry and where "the language of that application controlled,"

the representation on Line 6 of this tax return is by any measure "literally true." *Good*, 326 F.3d at 591-592. An excerpt of this return, admitted as Government Exhibit 94, is inserted below:



Count 12 alleges that line 7b of the 2019 IRS Form 1040, U.S. Individual Income Tax Return, for D.N. and M.N. is false. (Doc. 1). Line 7b directs the taxpayer and the preparer to "Add lines 1, 2b, 3b, 4b, 4d, 5b, 6, and 7a" and the form itself states, "This is your **total income**." (bold in original). On this tax return, the sum total of lines 1, 2b, 3b, 4b, 4d, 5b, 6, and 7a requires the following arithmetic: \$134,641 (line1), plus \$4,840 (line 2b), minus \$3,000 (line 6), plus \$78,768 (line 7a). That equals \$215,249. The indictment alleges that the "amount[]" of \$215,249 written on Line 7b and represented to be "Total income" is the "false item" that forms the basis of Count 12. (*See* Doc. 1). However, \$215,249 is literally true because it follows the specific instructions on the form <u>and</u> because it is the IRS on the form itself that is making the representation, "This is your **total income**," not the taxpayer or preparer. Just as in *Good*—where the "wording of the question" was the subject of the Fourth Circuit's inquiry and where "the language of that application controlled," the representation on Line 7b of this tax return is by any measure "literally true." *Good*, 326 F.3d at 591-592. An excerpt of this return, admitted as Government Exhibit 95, is inserted below:



Count 18 alleges that line 22 of IRS Form 1040 attached to the 2015 IRS Form 1040X, U.S. Individual Income Tax Return, for David Shane Simmons is false. (Doc. 1). Line 22 of the attached 1040 directs the taxpayer and the preparer to "[c]ombine the amounts in the far right column for lines 7 through 21" and then the form itself states, "This is your **total income**." (bold in original). On this tax return, the sum total of lines 7 through 21 requires the following arithmetic: \$68,986 (line 7) plus \$1,112 (line 10), minus \$231,573 (line 12). That equals -\$161,475. The indictment alleges that the "amount[]" of -\$161,475 written on Line 22 of the attached Form 1040 and represented to be "Total income" is the "false item" that forms the basis of Count 18. (*See* Doc. 1). However, -\$161,745 is literally true because it follows the specific instructions on the form <u>and</u> because it is the IRS on the form itself that is making the representation, "This is your **total income**," not the taxpayer or preparer. Just as in *Good*—where the "wording of the question" was the subject of the Fourth Circuit's inquiry and where "the language of that application controlled," the representation on Line 22 of this tax return is by any measure "literally true."


Good, 326 F.3d at 591-592. An excerpt of this return, admitted as Government Exhibit 207, is inserted below:

Form 704	U.S. Individual Incom	ne Tax Return	2015 CMB No. 1545-0074	IRS Use Only - Do n	not write or stayle in this s
	- Dec. 31, 2015, or other tax year beginning	, 2015, ending	, 20		parate instructions.
Your first name an	d initial	Last name		Your social sec	curity number
D Shane S	Simmons				5967
. It a joint return, spe	suse's first name and initial	Last name		Spouse's social	security number
Kimberly	B Simmons			-2	2026
	other and ensuelt. If you have a P.O. here see insten	Firms	Are no		
	7 Wages, salaries, tips, etc. Atta	ch Enrarie) W 2		7 7	68,986
ncome	8a Taxable interest. Atlach Sched			8a	00,300
	b Yav-eventot interest. Do not in	clude on line 8a	8.6		
	5 Yax-exempt interest. Do not in Se Ordinary dividends. Attach Sch		8ы	- Ga	
	9a Ordinary dividends. Attach Sch	nedule B if required		9a	
W-2 here, Also attach Forms	9a Ordinary dividends. Attach Sch 6 Qualified dividends	nedule B if required	9b	9a	1,112
W-2 here, Also httach Forms W-2G and 1099-R	9a Ordinary dividends. Attach Sch	nedule B if required	9b		1,112.
W-2 here, Also attach Forms W-2G and 1099-R f tax was withheld.	9a Ordinary dividends. Attach Sch b Qualified dividends	nedule B if required	9b income taxes	10	1,112
W-2 here, Also attach Forms W-2G and 1099-R of tax was withheld.	9a Ordinary dividends. Attach Sch b Qualified dividends. 10 Taxable refunds, credits, or off 11 Alimony received.	nedule B if required sets of state and local ach Schedule C or C.E.	9b income taxes	10	
W-2 here, Also altach Forms F-2G and 1099-R f tax was withheld. I you did not get a W-2,	9a Ordinary dividends. Attach Sch b Qualified dividends. 10 Taxable refunds, credits, or off 11 Alimony received. 12 Business income or (loss). Atta	nedule B if required facts of state and local ach Schedule C or C-E. D if required, If not required,	9b income taxes	10 11 12	
W-2 here, Also attach Forms #-2G and 1099-R f tax was withheld. If you did not get a W-2,	9a Ordinary dividends. Attach Sch b Qualified dividends. 10 Taxable refunds, credits, or off 11 Alimony received. 12 Business income or (loss). Atta 13 Capital gain or (loss). Attach Schedule 14 Other gains or (Josses). Attach	nedule B if required facts of state and local ach Schedule C or C-E. D if required, If not required,	9b income taxes	10 11 12 13	
W-2 here, Also iltach Forms #-2G and 1099-R f tax was withheld. I you did not pt a W-2,	9a Ordinary dividends. Attach Sch b Qualified dividends. 10 Taxable refunds, credits, or off 11 Alimony received. 12 Business income or (loss). Atta 13 Capital gain or (loss). Attach Schedule 14 Other gains or (lossers). Attach 15a IPA distributions.	nedule B if required feets of state and local ach Schedule C or C-E. b if required, If not required, Form 4797.	income taxes	10 11 12 13 14 15b	
W-2 here, Also ittach Forms Y-2G and 1099-R f tax was withheld. I you did not pt a W-2,	9a Ordinary dividends. Attach Sch b Qualified dividends. 10 Taxable refunds, credits, or off 11 Alimony received. 12 Business income or (loss). Atta 13 Capital gain or (loss). Attach Schedule 14 Other gains or (lossess). Attach 15a IRA distributions.	nedule B if required sets of state and local sech Schedule C or C-E. b if required, If not required, Form 4797. 15a	check here	10 11 12 13 14 15b	
W-2 here, Also altach Forms F-2G and 1099-R f tax was withheld. I you did not get a W-2,	9a Ordinary dividends. Aftach Sch b Qualified dividends. 10 Taxable refunds, credits, or off 11 Alimony received. 12 Business income or (loss). Att. 13 Capital gain or (loss). Attach 14 Other gains or (losses). Attach 15a (PA distributions.	nedule B if required  Insets of state and locel  B is required. If not required,  Form 4797.  15a  artnerships, S corporab  artnerships, S corporab	b Taxable amount b Taxable amount bons, trusts, etc. Attach Sched	10 11 12 13 14 15b 16b ule E. 17	
W-2 here, Also altach Forms F-2G and 1099-R f tax was withheld. I you did not get a W-2,	9a Ordinary dividends. Attach Sch b Qualified dividends. 10 Taxable refunds, credits, or off 11 Alimony received. 12 Business income or (loss). Attach 13 Capital gain or (loss). Attach 14 Other gains or (losses). Attach 15a IPA distributions. 16a Pensions and ammitties. 17 Rental real estate, royalties, pa 18 Farm income or (loss). Attach: 19 Unemployment compensation.	nedule B if required sets of state and local sech Schedule C or C-E. D if required, If not required, Form 4797. 15a 16a artherships, S corporati	check here	10 11 12 13 14 15b 16b 16b 11 18 19	
W-2 here, Also attach Forms #-2G and 1099-R f tax was withheld. If you did not get a W-2,	9a Ordinary dividends. Attach Sch b Qualified dividends. 10 Taxable refunds, credits, or off 11 Alimony received. 12 Business income or (loss). Attach 13 Capital gain or (loss). Attach 14 Other gains or (losses). Attach 15a IPA distributions. 16a Pensions and ammitties. 17 Rental real estate, royalties, pa 18 Farm income or (loss). Attach: 19 Unemployment compensation.	nedule B if required sets of state and local ach Schedule C or C-E. b if required, if not required, Form 4797. 15a 16a artherships, S corporab Schedule F.	b Taxable amount b Taxable amount bons, trusts, etc. Attach Sched	10 11 12 13 14 15b 16b ule E. 17	
Altach Form(s) W-2 here, Also attach Forms W-2 and 1099-R f faz was withheld. If you did not get a W-2, see instructions.	9a Ordinary dividends. Attach Sch b Qualified dividends. 10 Taxable refunds, credits, or off 11 Alimony received. 12 Business income or (loss). Att. 13 Capital gain or (loss). Attach 14 Other gains or (losses). Attach 15a (PA distributions. 16a Pensions and ammitiss. 17 Rental real estate, royalties, pa 18 Farm income or (loss). Attach: 19 Unerriployment compensation.	nedule B if required sets of state and local sech Schedule C or C-E. D if required, If not required, Form 4797. 15-a 16-a arthresships, S corporations of the schedule F. 20-a	check here   b Taxable amount ons, trusts, etc. Attach Sched	10 11 12 13 14 15b 16b 16b 16b 19 20b	


Count 19 alleges that line 22 of the 2016 IRS Form 1040, U.S. Individual Income Tax Return, for David Shane Simmons is false. (Doc. 1). Line 22 directs the taxpayer and the preparer to "[c]ombine the amounts in the far right column for lines 7 through 21" and then the form itself states, "This is your **total income**." (bold in original). On this tax return, the sum total of lines 7 through 21 requires the following arithmetic: \$69,036 (line 7) minus \$67,831 (line 12). That equals \$1,205. The indictment alleges that the "amount[]" of \$1,205 written on Line 22 and represented to be "Total income" is the "false item" that forms the basis of Count 19. (*See* Doc. 1). However, \$1,205 is literally true because it follows the specific instructions on the form *and* because it is the IRS on the form itself that is making the representation, "This is your **total income**," not the taxpayer or preparer. Just as in *Good*—where the "wording of the question" was the subject of the Fourth Circuit's inquiry and where "the language of that application controlled," the representation on Line 22 of this tax return is by any measure "literally true." *Good*, 326 F.3d at 591-592. An excerpt of this return, admitted as Government Exhibit 208, is inserted below:

For the year Jan. 1 - Dec Your first name and initia	. 31, 2016, or other tax year beginning	, 2016, ending List name	, 20		ee separat	e Instructions.
D Shane Sim			-16		596	The state of the s
s joint return, spouse's Kimberly B :		Last rame	502	Spouss	202	Decree of the second
			***		1 1	50.005
Income	7 Wages, salaries, tips, etc. Attack 8 a Taxable interest. Attach Schedu				7 8s	69,036.
	b Tax-exempt interest. Do not incl				0.0	
Allech French	9a Ordinary dividends, Attach Sche			Subbook	Sa	
Attach Form(s) W-2 here, Also	b Qualified dividends					
attach Forms	10 Taxable refunds, credits, or offsi				10	
W-ZG and 1099-R If tax was withheld.	11 Alimony received					
	12 Business Income or (loss). Altac					-67,831.
If you did not out a Ws2.	18 Capital gain or (loss). Attach Schedule D				13	
sae Instructions.	14 Other gains or (losses). Attach F				14	
		5a	b Taxable amount			
		6a	b Taxable amount		165	
	17 Rental real estate, royalties, part				17	
	18 Farm Income or (loss). Attach So				18	
	19 Unemployment compensation				19	
	20 a Social security benefits		b Taxable amount		20 b	
	27 Other income. List type and amount				21	1 005
	22 Combine the amounts in the far right celus	usa sor nines / askondu 5)*	ries is your total allcome	0.5.10	R.C.	1,205.

Count 20 alleges that line 22 of the 2017 IRS Form 1040, U.S. Individual Income Tax Return, for David Shane Simmons is false. (Doc. 1). Line 22 directs the taxpayer and the preparer to "[c]ombine the amounts in the far right column for lines 7 through 21" and then the form itself states, "This is your **total income**." (bold in original). On this tax return, the sum total of lines 7 through 21 requires the following arithmetic: \$70,874 (line 7) plus \$750 (line 8a), plus \$13 (line 9a), minus \$111,701 (line 17). That equals -\$40,064. The indictment alleges that the "amount[]" of -\$46,064 written on Line 22 and represented to be "Total income" is the "false item" that forms the basis of Count 20. (*See* Doc. 1). However, -\$40,064 is literally true because it follows the specific instructions on the form *and* because it is the IRS on the form itself that is making the representation, "This is your **total income**," not the taxpayer or preparer. Just as in *Good*—where the "wording of the question" was the subject of the Fourth Circuit's inquiry and where "the language of that application controlled," the representation on Line 22 of this tax return is by any measure "literally true." *Good*, 326 F.3d at 591-592. An excerpt of this return, admitted as Government Exhibit 209, is inserted below:



Count 21 alleges that line 6 of the 2018 IRS Form 1040, U.S. Individual Income Tax Return, for David Shane Simmons is false. (Doc. 1). Line 6 directs the taxpayer and the preparer to "Add lines 1 through 5. Add any amount from Schedule 1, line 22" and the form itself states, "Total income." On this tax return, the sum total of lines 1 through 5 and Schedule 1 line 22 requires the following arithmetic: \$66,614 (line1), plus \$240 (line 2b), plus \$69 (line 3b), plus \$8,686 (line 22). That equals \$75,609. The indictment alleges that the "amount[]" of \$75,609 written on Line 6 and represented to be "Total income" is the "false item" that forms the basis of Count 21 (*See* Doc. 1). However, \$75,609 is literally true because it follows the specific instructions on the form *and* because it is the IRS on the form itself that is making the representation, "This is your total income," not the taxpayer or preparer. Just as in *Good*—where the "wording of the question" was the subject of the Fourth Circuit's inquiry and where "the language of that application controlled," the representation on Line 6 of this tax return is by any measure "literally true." *Good*, 326 F.3d at 591-592. An excerpt of this return, admitted as Government Exhibit 210, is inserted below:



Count 22 alleges that line 7b of the 2019 IRS Form 1040, U.S. Individual Income Tax Return, for David Shane Simmons is false. (Doc. 1). Line 7b directs the taxpayer and the preparer to "Add lines 1, 2b, 3b, 4b, 4d, 5b, 6, and 7a" and the form itself states, "This is your total income." (bold in original). On this tax return, the sum total of lines 1, 2b, 3b, 4b, 4d, 5b, 6, and 7a requires the following arithmetic: \$68,580 (line1), plus \$4,284 (line 2b), plus \$6,000 (line 6), minus \$27,661 (line 7a). That equals \$51,203. The indictment alleges that the "amount[]" of \$51,203 written on Line 7b and represented to be "Total income" is the "false item" that forms the basis of Count 22. (See Doc. 1). However, \$51,203 is literally true because it follows the specific instructions on the form <u>and</u> because it is the IRS on the form itself that is making the representation, "This is your total income," not the taxpayer or preparer. Just as in Good—where the "wording of the question" was the subject of the Fourth Circuit's inquiry and where "the language of that application controlled," the representation on Line 7b of this tax return is by any measure "literally true." Good, 326 F.3d at 591-592. An excerpt of this return, admitted as Government Exhibit 211, is inserted below:

efile GRAPH	C p	rint - DO NOT PROCE	SS LATE	ST DAT	A - Produ	ction					DLN:	7021	1689615880
£1040	U.	rtment of the Tressury—Internal Re S. Individual Inco	venue Service ( me Tax R	99) eturn	2019	ОМВ	No. 1545-	0074	J IRS Ua	e Only-	—Do not	write or st	aple in this space.
Amended Retu	rn 🗆	Single Married filing jo	intly Marrie	ed filing se	parately (MF:	3) 🗆 H	ead of Hou	sehold	(HOH)		Qualifyin	g widow	(er) (QW)
Filing Status Check only one box		you checked the MFS box erson is a child but not you			use. If you	check th	e HOH or	QW bo	ox, ent	er the	child's	name i	if the qualifying
Your first name D SHANE & KIM		middle initial Y B <simmons td="" 🍠<=""><td></td><td>Last na</td><td>me</td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td>Your</td><td>social 5967</td><td></td><td>ty number</td></simmons>		Last na	me					Your	social 5967		ty number
If joint return, s	pous	e's first name and middle	initial	Last na	me					Spou	se's so 2026		curity number
		Wages, salaries, tips, etc	Attach Form	'e\ W-2							1	<b>9</b>	68,580
Standard	2a	Tax-exempt interest .	2a	3) 11-2	i i i i	axable inter	rest. Attach So	ch. Bifre	quired	: :	2b	93	4,284
Deduction for - Single or	3a	Oualified dividends	3a				dends. Attach				3b		1,001
Married filing	4a	IRA distributions	4a		ъ.	Taxable a	amount				4b		
separately, \$12,200						Taxable a	amount				4d		
<ul> <li>Married filing</li> </ul>	5a	Social security benefits	5a		ъ.	Taxable a	amount				5b		
jointly or Qualifying	6	Capital gain or (loss). Att	ach Schedule	D if requi	red. If not r	equired,	check her	re		▶ [	6	*	6,000
widow(er),	7a	Other income from Sched	lule 1, line 9		$c \cdot c \rightarrow$		* * *	$\times$			7a		-27,661
\$24,400	ь	Add lines 1, 2b, 3b, 4b, 4	d, 5b, 6, and	7a. This i	s your total	income				. •	7b		51,203

In other words, each and every count alleges that the sole false item on the specifically identified tax return at issue is the "total income" line. Two of those tax returns—the returns giving rise to Counts 3 and 6—contain no statement at all. Thus, on that ground alone, this Court should easily grant this motion for judgment of acquittal. The remaining tax returns contain literally true statements. Thus, as to all Section 7206(2) counts, this Court should grant this motion for judgment of acquittal.

To that end, the Seventh Circuit's analysis in *Reynolds*—also a criminal tax case involving an alleged false statement as to the total taxable income on a federal income tax return—brings the point home. In that case, the indictment alleged that Line 7 of an IRS Form 1040EZ, a simplified version of a U.S. Individual Income Tax Return, was false. *United States v. Reynolds*, 919 F.2d 435, 437 (7th Cir. 1990). But exactly as in this case, Line 7 was "derived arithmetically from other lines." *Id.* Just as here, the tax return directed the taxpayer and preparer to add and subtract ("Subtract line 6 from line 5. If line 6 is larger than line 5, enter 0 on line 7"). *Id.* And precisely as in this case, the tax return itself stated, "This is your taxable income." *Id.* (The tax return in Count 2 states, "This is your total income"). The Seventh Circuit concluded that the numbers baked into the numbers used in the arithmetic equation were false and even that the defendant in that case

likely violated two uncharged criminal tax statutes, 26 U.S.C. §§ 7201 and 7203. *Id.* ("Reynolds did not reveal his complete income (§ 7203) and evaded taxation on that income (§ 7201)"). But because the indictment charged a false statement statute and because the defendant's representation as to the total taxable income was literally true in that it was "derived arithmetically from other lines" and was correct, the Seventh Circuit reversed the convictions based on the literal truth defense. *Id.* at 439 ("The tax convictions are reversed").

This Court should follow the Seventh Circuit's lead for three fundamental reasons. *First*, the only federal appellate court to have ever considered this issue ruled consistent with this motion in a case that is as factually on point as it gets. Indeed, in the context of taxation cases, "courts temper the independence of the analysis in which they engage by according great weight to the decisions of other circuits on the same question. They do so because *the need for uniformity of decision applies with special force in tax matters.*" *Huff v. Comm'r of IRS*, 743 F.3d 790, 795 (11th Cir. 2014) (cleaned up, quoting *Birdman v. Office of the Governor*, 677 F.3d 167, 177 (3d Cir.2012), in turn quoting *Wash. Energy Co. v. United States*, 94 F.3d 1557, 1561 (Fed.Cir.1996)).

Second, this is consistent with the Fourth Circuit's precedent governing false statement allegations on government forms. Third, a plain application of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29 establishes that there is no false statement because a statement that is literally true and consistent with the instructions on the tax form cannot possibly be literally false. Indeed, any other reading would make it impossible not to commit the felony charged in this case—because any other representation on Line 22 would, by definition, not be a combination of the amounts in the farright column for lines 7 through 21 and that is what is supposed to be reflected in Line 22 per the form.

# B. This Court Cannot Constructively Amend the Indictment by Permitting the Jury to Convict Kohn Based on Uncharged Alleged False Items on the Tax Returns at Issue

The Fifth Amendment provides, "[n]o person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury[.]" The "right to have the grand jury make the charge on its own judgment is a substantial right which cannot be taken away with or without court amendment." *Stirone v. United States*, 361 U.S. 212, 218-19 (1960).

The Fourth Circuit has spoken forcefully about constructive amendments. "When the government, through its presentation of evidence and/or its argument, or the district court, through its instructions to the jury, or both, broadens the bases for conviction beyond those charged in the indictment, a constructive amendment—sometimes referred to as a fatal variance—occurs." United States v. Randall, 171 F.3d 195, 203 (4th Cir. 1999) (citing United States v. Redd, 161 F.3d 793, 795 (4th Cir. 1998)). Indeed, a constructive amendment is such a grave constitutional violation that, in the Fourth Circuit, "a constructive amendment violates the Fifth Amendment right to be indicted by a grand jury, is error per se, and must be corrected on appeal even when the defendant did not preserve the issue by objection." See id. (citing United States v. Floresca, 38 F.3d 706, 712-13 (4th Cir. 1994) (en banc); see also United States v. Whirlwind Soldier, 499 F.3d 862, 870 (8th Cir. 2007) (a "constructive amendment of an indictment is reversible error per se") (internal citations omitted). In this case, Kohn has a "substantial right to be tried only on charges presented in an indictment returned by a grand jury. Deprivation of such a basic right is far too serious to be treated as nothing more than a variance and dismissed as harmless error." Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 217 (1960).

In *United States v. Farr*, 536 F.3d 1174, 1181 (10th Cir. 2008), a tax evasion case, "the district court essentially allowed the jury to consider two possible bases for conviction—the flawed one outlined in the indictment and another more accurate one added at trial." That court noted, "the government opted to include in its indictment particulars" and "the language employed by the government in its indictments becomes an essential and delimiting part of the charge itself, such that if an indictment charges particulars, the jury instructions and evidence introduced at trial must comport with those particulars." *Id.* Farr was charged with evading the quarterly employment tax for ATHA-Genesis Chapter and his attorney waited until opening statement to argue that an individual cannot owe employment taxes of the corporation. *Id.* Reversing the conviction for a jury instruction that did not hold the Government to what the indictment alleged, that court explained that the Government may have been "in a 'ditch' but it was a ditch created by the government's own charging document." *Id.* The "charging document"—not the prosecution's conception of what the Executive Branch meant by certain terminology—was determinative. *Id.* 

In this case, there is no dispute the Government charged particulars and then those particulars were removed by the Court following the close of evidence. Indeed, the Government successfully fended off a pretrial motion facially challenging the indictment by representing to this Court that the indictment was sufficient precisely because of the particulars it charged: "In terms of the substantive tax return counts, it charges a specific year, the client, the line items on the returns." (See Transcript of Dec. 19, 2023 Hearing at pg. 65). This was said in the context of the Government's characterization of what the indictment alleges: "the indictment must contain the elements of the crimes and fairly inform them of the charges...they clearly understand what the charges are. That's because the indictment fully lays them out." (Id. at 64-65) (emphasis added).

The Court's allowance of the redaction of "Line X" from each of the substantive counts fundamentally and impermissibly amended the indictment.

By charging particulars the Government did not prove at trial, the Government is no doubt "in a 'ditch' but it [is] a ditch created by the government's own charging document." Farr, 536 F.3d at 1181. As the Tenth Circuit explained in its thoughtful analysis of the constructive amendment issue, "to decide that question, we therefore compare the indictment with the district court proceedings to discern if those proceedings broadened the possible bases for conviction beyond those found in the operative charging document." Id. at 1180 (emphasis added). In other words, the analysis is limited to comparing what actually transpired at trial and the four corners of the charging document—because the indictment reflects the words of the grand jury. The Second Circuit has similarly explained that "an indictment drawn in more general terms may support a conviction on alternate bases, even though an indictment with specific charging terms will not." United States v. Zingaro, 858 F.2d 94, 99 (2d Cir. 1988).

### C. This Court Should Grant a Judgment of Acquittal as to Counts 2 through 12 and 18 through 22 Because the Government Has Not Established Venue

"The sixth amendment unequivocally mandates trial in the 'State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed,' and proof of venue is therefore an essential part of the government's case without which there can be no conviction." *United States v. Blecker*, 657 F.2d 629, 632 (4th Cir. 1981) (*quoting United States v. Jones*, 174 F.2d 746, 748 (7th Cir. 1949)). In performing an inquiry into the venue of the charged offenses, "a court must initially identify the conduct constituting the offense . . . and then discern the location of the commission of the criminal acts." *United States v. Rodriguez-Moreno*, 526 U.S. 275, 279 (1999). Where, as here, a defendant is charged with multiple counts in an indictment, venue requirements must be met for each individual count alleged. *United States v. Smith*, 452 F.3d 323, 335 (4th Cir. 2006). In analyzing

whether venue is proper, the Court "must focus on the 'essential conduct elements' of the charged offense." *United States v. Ebersole*, 411 F.3d 517, 524 (4th Cir. 2005) (*quoting United States v. Bowens*, 224 F.3d 302, 311 (4th Cir. 2000)).

The Sixth Amendment demands that in "all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law." U.S. Const., amend. VI. As such, the "government *must* prosecute an offense in a district where the offense was committed." Fed. R. Crim. P. 18 (emphasis added).

In considering the *essential conduct elements* as they pertain specifically to Kohn for Counts 2 through 12 and Counts 18 through 22, the Government has not introduced evidence that Kohn "willfully aid[ed] or assist[ed] in, or procure[d], counsel[ed], or advise[d] the preparation or presentation . . . of a return . . . which [was] fraudulent or [was] false as to any material matter" within the Western District of North Carolina. 26 U.S.C. § 7206(2).

In fact, even in the light most favorable to the Government, the evidence unequivocally establishes that The Kohn Partnership's office was based in the Eastern District of Missouri at all times relevant to the indictment, and that all acts taken by Kohn—if any—in the preparation and presentation of the tax returns at issue were taken in the Eastern District of Missouri. The undisputed testimony is that all tax returns were submitted to the IRS from St. Louis, Missouri and the Government has not established that they were sent to a service center in the Western District of North Carolina (because there was and is no such IRS service center). Thus, the Government bore the burden of establishing *some act* of Kohn's that aided or assisted in procuring, counseling, or advising *the preparation or presentation* of the tax return at issue as to each count in the Western District of North Carolina—and the Government has not met its burden. Thus, because "proof of

venue is therefore an essential part of the government's case without which there can be no conviction," *Blecker*, 657 F.2d at 632, the law mandates entry of a judgment of acquittal as to the substantive Section 7206(2) counts.

As it relates to Counts 2, 3, and 4, Craig Sullivan did not testify about any acts specific to his 2017 IRS Form 1040 (Count 2), 2018 IRS Form 1040 (Count 3), or 2019 IRS Form 1040 (Count 4) that would establish venue in the Western District of North Carolina. And the fact that he lived in this judicial district is not itself dispositive because this Court "must focus on the 'essential conduct elements' of the charged offense." *Ebersole*, 411 F.3d at 524. The Government did not ask Mr. Sullivan about his geographic whereabouts with respect to any discussion as to any specific tax return. Thus, the Government has not established venue.

As it relates to Counts 5 and 6, Karen Bare did not testify about any acts specific to her 2015 IRS Form 1040 (Count 5) or 2016 IRS Form 1040X (Count 6) that would establish venue in the Western District of North Carolina. And the fact that she lived in this judicial district is not itself dispositive because this Court "must focus on the 'essential conduct elements' of the charged offense." *Ebersole*, 411 F.3d at 524. The Government did not ask Ms. Bare about her geographic whereabouts with respect to any discussion as to any specific tax return. Thus, the Government has not established venue.

As it relates to Counts 7, 8, and 9, Greg Bower did not testify about any acts specific to his 2017 IRS Form 1040 (Count 7), 2018 IRS Form 1040 (Count 8), or 2019 IRS Form 1040 (Count 9) that would establish venue in the Western District of North Carolina. And the fact that he lived in this judicial district is not itself dispositive because this Court "must focus on the 'essential conduct elements' of the charged offense." *Ebersole*, 411 F.3d at 524. The Government did not

ask Mr. Bower about his geographic whereabouts with respect to any discussion as to any specific tax return. Thus, the Government has not established venue.

As it relates to Counts 10, 11, and 12, Damian Novak did not testify about any acts specific to his 2018 IRS Form 1040 (Count 10), 2019 IRS Form 1040 (Count 11), or 2020 IRS Form 1040 (Count 12) that would establish venue in the Western District of North Carolina. In fact, he testified that at all relevant times, he lived in Minnesota. The Government did not ask Mr. Novak about his geographic whereabouts with respect to any discussion as to any specific tax return. Thus, the Government has not established venue.

Finally, as it relates to Counts 18, 19, 20, 21, and 22, the Government has not introduced sufficient evidence to establish venue. The *only* witness who testified in any way about Mr. Simmons' tax returns was Brandi [Marlow] Davis—and she was not asked a single question about any of the specific tax returns at issue and the location where any acts associated with those returns occurred. And the fact that Mr. Simmons lived and worked in this judicial district is not itself dispositive because this Court "must focus on the 'essential conduct elements' of the charged offense." *Ebersole*, 411 F.3d at 524. Thus, the Government has not established venue.

To be clear, Kohn acknowledges that venue *can* lie in a district other than where the tax return at issue was prepared, the place from which it was mailed or electronically-filed, and the location of the IRS center where it was sent—none of which occurred in the Western District of North Carolina as to any count. *See United States v. Hirschfeld*, 964 F.2d 318, 321 (4th Cir. 1992).

But venue must undisputedly be established as to every count and as to each defendant. See Smith, 275 F.3d at 378; see also United States v. Villarini, 238 F.3d 530, 533-34 (4th Cir.2001) (venue "on a count is proper only in a district in which an essential conduct element of the offense took place"). Thus, as it relates to Kohn, this Court "must then determine where the criminal

conduct was committed." *Smith*, 375 F.3d at 378. Where, as here, Kohn is "charged with multiple counts, venue must lie *as to each individual count*." *Id*. (citing to *United States v. Robinson*, 275 F.3d 371, 378 (4th Cir. 2001)).

As to Counts 2 through 12 and 18 through 22, the Government has failed to establish venue as the Sixth Amendment requires. Thus, this Court should enter a judgment of acquittal for each of these counts.

#### III. In the Alternative, this Court Should Grant Kohn a New Trial

Rule 33(a) provides, "[u]pon the defendant's motion, the court may vacate any judgment and grant a new trial if the interest of justice so requires." "By its terms, Rule 33 confers broad discretion on a district court." *United States v. Prescott*, 221 F.3d 686, 688 (4th Cir. 2000). While the Fourth Circuit has stated that this discretion should be exercised "sparingly," *United States v. Perry*, 335 F.3d 316, 321 (4th Cir. 2003), it has also held that "the interest of justice is the touchstone for consideration," *United States v. Mitchell*, 602 F.2d 636, 639 (4th Cir. 1979); *see also United States v. D'Amelio*, 636 F.Supp.2d 234, 238 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) ("The Court's broad discretion empowers it to grant relief based not only on the sufficiency of the evidence at trial but on any other circumstance that might render the trial 'essentially unfair,' including trial errors."). Instructively, the Fourth Circuit has said that "the court's authority is much broader than when it is deciding a motion to acquit . . . the district court is not constrained by the requirement that it view the evidence in the light most favorable to the government . . . [and] it may evaluate the credibility of the witnesses." *United States v. Campbell*, 977 F.2d 854, 860 (4th Cir. 1992).

Kohn respectfully incorporates herein each argument in support of his motion for a Rule 29 judgment of acquittal as an argument also in support of his motion for a new trial. In the event

this Court denies Kohn's motion for judgment of acquittal, Kohn respectfully requests that this Court consider those grounds as sufficient grounds to grant Kohn, at a minimum, a new trial.

In addition to the incorporated Rule 29 arguments, Kohn asserts that the denial of his motion in limine regarding evidence of his prior conviction allowed evidence to be introduced that, in the interest of justice, requires a new trial. The now-recognized unconstitutional nature of Kohn's prior conviction under 26 U.S.C. § 7212(a) and the irrelevant and prejudicial nature of the conviction under the Federal Rules of Evidence provide independent and overlapping grounds to grant Kohn a new trial.

### A. Marinello Clearly Established That Kohn's Conviction is Outside of the Scope of 26 U.S.C. § 7212(a)

In 2002, Kohn pled guilty to a one-count information charging him with violating 26 U.S.C. § 7212(a)'s "omnibus clause." The parties agreed that the way in which Kohn violated Section 7212(a) was by devising generalized tax planning strategies and preparing tax returns.

However, in 2018, the Supreme Court reined in the scope of Section 7212(a) in order to save the statute from unconstitutional overbreadth. *See Marinello v. United States*, 138 S. Ct. 1101 (2018). The Court held that the Government was required to prove two additional elements to secure a conviction under Section 7212(a): (1) the existence of a nexus between a defendant's alleged conduct and a particular administrative proceeding; and (2) that the particular administrative proceeding was pending at the time the defendant engaged in the allegedly obstructive conduct or, at a minimum, was reasonably foreseeable by the defendant. *Marinello*, 138 S. Ct. at 1109-10. The Eighth Circuit—where venue lies in that case—subsequently observed,

Before *Marinello*, this Court required three elements for a § 7212(a) offense: (1) in any way corruptly (2) endeavoring (3) to obstruct or impede the due administration of the Internal Revenue Code. *Marinello* thus added two elements—a nexus and knowledge of a currently-pending or reasonably foreseeable proceeding—that this Court did not previously require.

United States v. Beckham, 917 F.3d 1059, 1064 (8th Cir. 2019) (internal citations omitted).

In April 2021, the Eighth Circuit further explained:

In *Marinello*, the Supreme Court considered the scope of the Omnibus Clause and determined that "the clause as a whole refers to specific interference with targeted governmental tax-related proceedings, such as a particular investigation or audit," rather than routine tax procedures such as the processing of returns. 138 S.Ct. at 1104. The Supreme Court thus held: "[T]o secure a conviction under the Omnibus Clause, the Government must show (among other things) that there is a 'nexus' between the defendant's conduct and a particular administrative proceeding, such as an investigation, an audit, or other targeted administrative action. That nexus requires a 'relationship in time, causation, or logic with the [administrative] proceeding." *Id.* at 1109 (quoting *United States v. Aguilar*, 515 U.S. 593, 599, 115 S.Ct. 2357, 132 L.Ed.2d 520 (1995)). The government also must show the particular proceeding was "pending at the time the defendant engaged in the obstructive conduct or, at the least, was then reasonably foreseeable by the defendant." *Id.* at 1110.

United States v. Prelogar, 996 F.3d 526, 531 (8th Cir. 2021).

The bottom line is that—by any measure—the entire basis of Kohn's 2002 conviction is unconstitutional because it falls outside the scope of the criminal statute. In this case, there can be no meaningful dispute that Kohn pled guilty to conduct that falls outside the scope of Section 7212(a). In other words, even taking at face value each and every act set out in the charging document and the Stipulation of Facts, Kohn did not violate Section 7212(a) based on binding Supreme Court and Eighth Circuit precedent—because none of the acts had a nexus to a targeted administrative proceeding. At most, Kohn gave tax advice and prepared tax returns, not connected to any proceeding and, at worst, knew the IRS may catch onto his unlawful scheme eventually. *See Marinello*, 138 S. Ct. at 1110. But as a matter of law, that is not a violation of Section 7212(a).

This is precisely the type of prosecutorial overreach the Supreme Court held constitutes an unconstitutionally overbroad interpretation of Section 7212(a), and there is no justice in allowing this conviction to further prejudice Kohn because it preexisted *Marinello*.

### B. Evidence of the 2002 Conviction is Irrelevant, Unfairly Prejudicial, and Inflammatory Regardless of the Constitutionality of the Underlying Conviction

Any reference to the 2002 plea and conviction in a trial more than 20 years later is irrelevant, unfairly prejudicial, and runs afoul of the Federal Rules of Evidence. "Evidence of a crime, wrong, or other act is not admissible to prove a person's character in order to show that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character." Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(1); *see also* Fed. R. Evid. 401 (evidence is relevant only if it has "any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence") and 402 (irrelevant evidence is inadmissible). Even if the prior conviction is determined to be relevant, Federal Rule of Evidence 403 provides that relevant evidence "may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." Fed. R. Evid. 403.

To assess whether evidence is admissible under Rule 404(b) and 403, the Fourth Circuit has set forth a four-prong test:

First, 'the evidence must be relevant to an issue, such as an element of an offense, and must not be offered to establish the general character of the defendant.' Second, '[t]he act must be necessary in the sense that it is probative of an essential claim or an element of the offense.' Third, '[t]he evidence must be reliable.' And fourth, 'the evidence's probative value must not be substantially outweighed by confusion or unfair prejudice in the sense that it tends to subordinate reason to emotion in the factfinding process.'

United States v. Hall, 858 F.3d 254, 266 (4th Cir. 2017) (quoting United States v. Queen, 132 F.3d 991, 997 (4th Cir. 1997)).

Under the first prong, evidence of a conviction which occurred more than 20 years before this case was presented for indictment is too far attenuated in time to be relevant to an issue, including any element of a charged offense, in the current case. Further, under the second prong, the prior conviction is not necessary for any essential element of the charged offenses as it, again, relates to conduct occurring over 20 years ago. But, even assuming the Court finds the first three prongs of the test are satisfied, the fourth prong, a Rule 403 analysis, militates against admission of this conviction.

Evidence of his prior conviction was extremely and unfairly prejudicial to Kohn. Because the jury heard about Kohn's prior conviction, an unacceptable risk was created that the jury convicted him in this case, not because the Government has proven him guilty of any of the federal tax crimes charged beyond a reasonable doubt, but because the jury improperly concluded that Kohn's prior conviction somehow makes it more likely that he committed the charged offense in this case. "Because juries can 'hardly avoid' inferring that a prior conviction makes it more likely that a defendant committed the charged offense, 'evidence of similar offenses . . . should be admitted sparingly if at all." *United States v. Chin*, 2023 WL 2633594, at \*4 (S.D.W. Va. Mar 24, 2023) (*quoting United States v. Sanders*, 964 F.2d 295, 297-98 (4th Cir 1992)). Clearly, the unfair prejudice from evidence of Kohn's prior conviction substantially outweighs any probative value of such evidence and should not have been admissible in his trial.

#### C. The Court's Failure to Instruct the Jury on Literal Truth Requires a New Trial

Failing to give a requested jury instruction that "(1) was correct; (2) was not substantially covered by the court's charge to the jury; and (3) dealt with some point in the trial so important, that failure to give the requested instruction seriously impaired the defendant's ability to conduct his defense" is reversible error in the Fourth Circuit, and certainly is grounds for the granting of a

new trial under Rule 33. *United States v. Hickman*, 626 F.3d 756, 771 (4th Cir. 2010). Kohn requested that the Court, in its final jury instructions, give an instruction regarding literal truth. *Ruschky & Shealy, Pattern Jury Instructions for Federal Criminal Cases, District of South Carolina, p. 647 (2024 Online Edition).* The proposed instruction was, indeed, correct as it was a pattern instruction promulgated by the District of South Carolina, a common and well-recognized source of jury instructions in this District. The proposed instruction was not substantially covered by any other instruction given by the Court. Indeed, it is a standalone legal concept that has its own pattern instruction, therefore demonstrating its necessity in appropriate situations. Finally, under the test, the failure to give this instruction seriously impaired Kohn's ability to conduct his defense. An essential element of 26 U.S.C. § 7206(2) is that the return "was fraudulent or false as to a material matter." The literal truth defense, of which evidence was adduced at trial, was essential to Kohn's constitutional right to present a complete defense. Because that avenue was foreclosed through the Court failing to give an appropriate jury instruction, the interest of justice requires a new trial under Rule 33.

#### IV. Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, Kohn respectfully moves this Court to enter a judgment of acquittal pursuant to Rule 29(c). In the alternative, this Court should enter an order granting Kohn a new trial.

Respectfully submitted,

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#### **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

I hereby certify that the foregoing was filed electronically with the Clerk of Court and that all counsel of record received notice.

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